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ABSTRACT
In the fall of 2010, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a bill that
would have overridden a New Deal-era federal statute forbidding
retired Justices from serving by designation on the Supreme Court of
the United States. The Leahy bill would have authorized the Court to
recall willing retired Justices to substitute for recused Justices. This
Article uses the Leahy bill as a springboard for considering a number
of important constitutional and policy questions, including whether
the possibility of 4–4 splits justifies the substitution of a retired Justice
for an active one; whether permitting retired Justices to substitute for
recused Justices would violate Article III’s requirement that there be
“one supreme Court”; and whether the ethical limitations on
extrajudicial activities should be the same for active and retired judges
and Justices. In addition to relying on published material, we draw on
information gleaned from our interview with retired Justice Stevens,
who was the original source of the Leahy proposal.
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INTRODUCTION
In her first term as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, Elena Kagan recused herself from roughly one1
third of the cases on the Court’s docket. Although Justices do not
2
typically divulge their grounds for recusing, the reason for all of
these recusals was obvious: Kagan believed that her participation in
various aspects of these cases in her former role as solicitor general
3
created at least the appearance of impropriety. Kagan perhaps could
have taken a narrower view and recused herself in fewer cases;

1. During the 2010 term, Justice Kagan recused herself from twenty-eight cases. October
Term 2010, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/ot2010 (last visited Sept.
5, 2011); Nina Totenberg, The Robe Seems To Suit New Justice Kagan, NPR (Dec. 27, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/2010/12/27/132109642/the-robe-seems-to-suit-new-justice-kagan. The Court
heard eighty-two merits cases in the October 2010 Term. Stat Pack for October Term 2010,
SCOTUSBLOG, 1 (June 28, 2011), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/
SB_OT10_stat_pack_final.pdf.
2. But cf. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (order denying
motion to recuse) (discussing the grounds for the request of his own recusal but ultimately
denying the motion).
3. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Recusals Could Force Newest Justice To Miss Many Cases,
WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2010, at A15 (“Kagan is recusing herself from cases in which she had a role
in drafting a brief for the Supreme Court, or when she was actively involved in a case in the
lower courts.”).
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nevertheless, once the deed was done, the Court was left
shorthanded.
Into the breach stepped Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
4
Committee Patrick Leahy, who introduced a bill that would lift a
New Deal-era prohibition on retired Supreme Court Justices sitting
5
by designation on the high court. Under the Leahy proposal, a
majority of the active Justices would have been able to designate a
6
retired Justice to substitute for a recused Justice. The proposal
7
seemed especially timely in autumn 2010 because there were—and as

4. Senator Patrick Leahy’s September 29, 2010, bill was simple in its concept and its
language: “To amend chapter 13 of title 28, United States Code, to authorize the designation
and assignment of retired justices of the Supreme Court to particular cases in which an active
justice is recused.” S. 3871, 111th Cong. pmbl. (2010). In other words, in any Supreme Court
case in which a sitting Justice was recused, a retired Supreme Court Justice could be tapped to
take her place in deciding the case. The September 29 bill read as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. DESIGNATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RETIRED
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES.
Section 294 of title 28, United States Code, is amended—
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ after ‘‘(a)’’;
(2) by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(2) Any retired Chief Justice of the United States or any retired Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court may be designated and assigned to serve as a justice on the
Supreme Court of the United States in a particular case if—
‘‘(A) any active justice is recused from that case; and
‘‘(B) a majority of active justices vote to designate and assign that retired Chief
Justice or Associate Justice.’’; and
(3) in subsection (d), by striking ‘‘No such designation or assignment shall be
made to the Supreme Court.’’ and inserting ‘‘Except as provided under subsection
(a)(2), no designation or assignment under this section shall be made to the
Supreme Court.’’
Id. sec. 1.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (2006) (“No . . . designation or assignment [of retired judges or
Justices] shall be made to the Supreme Court.”).
6. S. 3871 sec. 1, § 2.
7. Senator Leahy introduced this bill on September 29, 2010. On November 8, 2010, the
authors spoke for approximately twenty minutes by telephone conference call with Justice
Stevens, who was in his chambers in Washington, D.C. We did not record the conversation, but
each of us took detailed notes. Justice Stevens told us that he and then-Chief Justice Rehnquist
had the idea several years ago to enlist retired Justices as substitutes for recused Justices, but
were unable to persuade their colleagues to seek legislation authorizing the proposal. Following
his decision to retire, Justice Stevens met with Senator Leahy, who asked him if he had any
ideas for the improvement of the Court’s operations. At that point, Justice Stevens suggested
that retired Justices could be enlisted to serve as substitutes for recused Justices. Telephone
Interview with John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice (retired), Supreme Court of the U.S. (Nov. 8,
2010) (notes on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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this Article goes to press, continue to be—three retired Justices in
8
good mental and physical condition.
9
Adoption of the Leahy bill could avoid some 4–4 split decisions,
but it answers no pressing need. Indeed, as we explain, implementing
the proposal would raise a substantial number of questions of policy,
administrability, and constitutionality. Accordingly, we do not
endorse the Leahy bill.
Nonetheless, we are sympathetic to the spirit of the Leahy
proposal because retired Justices currently represent a valuable and
underutilized human resource. The Leahy proposal thus raises the
broader question of how retired Justices who wish to remain active in
public life may do so consistently with judicial ethics and
constitutional constraints. Furthermore, in seeking to draw on the
experience and expertise of retired Justices, the Leahy proposal and
the others that we discuss in this Article present an opportunity to
explore questions about the nature of the office held by active
Supreme Court Justices, no less than retired ones.
This Article uses the Leahy proposal to frame discussion of the
foregoing issues. Part I briefly recounts the history of retirements
from the Court. Part II canvasses the costs and benefits of asking
retired Justices to participate in a substitution system. Part III
considers constitutional objections to the Leahy bill. Part IV
considers other roles that in the past have been, and in the future
could be, assigned to willing retired Justices. The Article concludes by
arguing for broad utilization of the services of retired Justices.
I. RETIRED JUSTICES THROUGHOUT HISTORY AND TODAY
The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the
twenty-first century brought many changes to the American judicial
system, but one largely overlooked development was the survival of
retired Supreme Court Justices, most of them able-bodied and

8. The retired Justices are Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter.
9. As discussed in Part II.C, infra, according to longstanding tradition, 4–4 splits do not
create precedent but instead simply result in the lower court decision’s being affirmed. Durant
v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 112 (1868); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme
Court of the United States, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 646 (2002) (“The traditional practice of
the Supreme Court of the United States is that ‘no affirmative action can be had in a cause
where the judges are equally divided in opinion as to the judgment to be rendered or order to be
made.’” (quoting Durant, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 110)).
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10

mentally sharp. Over the course of American history, most Supreme
Court Justices “remain[ed] on the court until they died (the exit
strategy of 49 of the 103 Justices not currently serving) or became
enfeebled by age (recall the explanation that Justice Thurgood
Marshall gave when he retired in 1991 at the age of 83: ‘I’m old and
11
falling apart.’).” Indeed, before the 1990s, it was not unusual for a
Justice to retire when no other retired Justice was living and
12
competent. And before 1937, when Congress passed the Retirement
Act, retirement was not even possible; resignation was the only
13
available option.
In the 1990s, however, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell,
White, and Blackmun were simultaneously alive and in reasonably

10. A significant exception was Justice Thurgood Marshall. See infra text accompanying
note 11.
11. Linda Greenhouse, Justice Unbound, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Dec. 2, 2010, 9:44
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/justice-unbound. In large part, the
reluctance to retire came about because “resigned” Justices did not receive pensions. Indeed,
historically, even Justices enfeebled by age remained on the Court so that they could continue
to draw a salary, even when they were no longer physically or mentally capable of performing
the job. For example, Edward Bates, attorney general under Abraham Lincoln, wrote on April
11, 1864, that four Supreme Court Justices—Chief Justice Taney and Associate Justices Catron,
Grier, and Wayne—wanted to retire but were unable to do so because Congress had not passed
a pension bill and their salaries were their sole means of support. THE DIARY OF EDWARD
BATES 1859–1866, at 358 (Howard K. Beale ed., 1933). Chief Justice Taney died that year and
left his orphaned daughters a tiny estate. Ross E. Davies, The Judiciary Fund: A Modest
Proposal That the Bar Give to Judges What Congress Will Not Let Them Earn, 11 GREEN BAG
2D 357, 359 (2008). Seven years later, his children were in such dire circumstances that the
Supreme Court petitioned to set up a fund on their behalf. Id. Meanwhile, the Judiciary Act of
1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44, provided living Justices who had reached the age of seventy and who
had served for at least ten years with a lifetime pension of their yearly salary as of the date of
their retirement. Id. § 5. A comprehensive study of Article III judges shows that pension
eligibility plays a crucial role in the timing of the decision to resign, retire, or take senior status.
See Albert Yoon, Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of Federal Judges,
1869–2002, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 143, 145 (2006) (“The key empirical finding of this article
identifies pensions . . . as the primary determinant of judicial turnover.”). Although the study
finds that Supreme Court Justices—unlike district and circuit court judges—do not synchronize
their decisions to cease active service with pension eligibility, id., that finding hardly casts doubt
on the proposition that the ability to receive any payment whatsoever influences the decision of
a Justice to step down before death or enfeeblement.
12. See DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE BENCH: SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AT THE
END 104–54 (1999) (describing the retirements, resignations, and deaths of Justices from 1937
through 1987).
13. See Act of Mar. 1, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-870, 45 Stat. 1422 (repealed 1937) (allowing
Supreme Court Justices to resign but not retire). In Part III, infra, we discuss the differences
between resignation and retirement. See infra text accompanying notes 94–99.
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good health for at least part of their retirements. Between 2005 and
15
2010, Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Stevens retired from their
positions on the Court, all before their health or mental competence
16
required them to do so. Even though modern Justices often serve
17
longer than their historical counterparts, it may not come as a
18
surprise that they find themselves ready to retire after twenty,
19
20
twenty-five, or even thirty-five years in their demanding roles on
the Court.
Indeed, as Professor David Atkinson notes, Justices have
historically retired for one or more of eight reasons: “(1) the threat of
impeachment; (2) an attractive pension; (3) ambition;
(4) dissatisfaction or weariness; (5) poor health or declining physical
energy; (6) mental decline or disability; (7) family pressure; and (8) a
14. As the previous quotation indicates, see supra text accompanying note 11, Justice
Marshall was retired and still living from 1991 to 1993, but he was in very poor health, and his
physical condition predicated his retirement.
15. Justice O’Connor announced her intended retirement in July 2005, but she did not
actually retire until the confirmation and investiture of her successor, Justice Alito, in January
2006. President George W. Bush had originally chosen John G. Roberts, Jr., to replace
O’Connor. Upon Chief Justice Rehnquist’s death, the president withdrew his nomination of
Roberts for Associate Justice to appoint him to be Chief Justice. David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito
Sworn In as Justice After Senate Gives Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A21; see also R.
SAM GARRETT & DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33118, SPEED OF
PRESIDENTIAL AND SENATE ACTIONS ON SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS, 1900–2010, at 4–7
(2010) (discussing the nomination processes of Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts).
16. According to news and self-reports, Justice O’Connor retired primarily to care for her
husband, who had Alzheimer’s disease. Richard W. Stevenson, O’Connor To Retire, Touching
Off Battle over Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at A1. Justice Souter retired primarily to return
to his native New Hampshire. Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny, Souter’s Exit To Give Obama First
Opening, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2009, at A1. Justice Stevens apparently retired simply because,
having served on the Court longer than all but two other Justices in American history, he
wished to spend his remaining years engaged in other pursuits. Ross E. Davies, Craig D. Rust &
Adam Aft, Supreme Court Sluggers: John Paul Stevens Is No Stephen J. Field, 13 GREEN BAG
2D 465, 465 (2010).
17. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 188–89.
18. David Souter received his Associate Justice commission on October 3, 1990, and
assumed senior status on June 30, 2009. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Souter, David
Hackett, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2244&cid=999&ctype=
na&instate=na (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
19. Sandra Day O’Connor received her Associate Justice commission on September 22,
1981, and assumed senior status on January 31, 2006. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges:
O’Connor, Sandra Day, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1796&cid
=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
20. John Paul Stevens received his Associate Justice commission on December 17, 1975,
and assumed senior status on June 30, 2010. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Stevens,
John Paul, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2290&cid=999&ctype
=na&instate=na (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
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voluntary choice even though they remain capable of doing the
21
work.” And regardless of the reason a Justice chooses to retire,
22
“early” retirement is made easier by the statutory pension scheme
set out for retired Justices. Justices who retire under the “rule of
23
eighty” may collect whatever their full salary was at the time of their
24
retirement. Justices who wish to continue to serve on the lower
federal courts are entitled to subsequently enacted judicial pay raises,
25
if they occur.
But when relatively young and healthy, even vigorous, Justices
retire, they do not typically sit idly by and watch as the world marches
on without them. Justices who have retired since the 1960s have
tended to engage in a wide range of activities: They give interviews
26
27
and speeches; they teach law students and other adults; they chair
21. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 1. On the other hand, Atkinson posits that there have also
been eight reasons why Justices decline to retire voluntarily over the years: “(1) financial
considerations; (2) party or ideology; (3) a determination to stay; (4) a sense of indispensability;
(5) loss of status; (6) a belief they can still do the work; (7) not knowing what else to do;
(8) family pressure to stay in office.” Id. at 8 (noting that some of these reasons, such as
financial considerations and feeling at a loss for how to occupy time, are no longer serious
concerns). With respect to Atkinson’s second factor, there is certainly anecdotal evidence of
Justices timing their retirement to coincide with the term of a president thought likely to name a
successor who shared the retiring Justice’s jurisprudential views. Retiring Justices, however,
tend to deny such motivation. Cf. Anthony Lewis, Op-Ed., The Blackmun Legacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 1994, at A27 (reporting a statement by Justice Blackmun urging President Clinton not to
“use a litmus test . . . but just [to] pick good judges” (omission in original)). Whatever one
makes of individual examples, there is little statistical evidence of judges and Justices timing
their retirements based on the expected ideology of their successors. See Yoon, supra note 11, at
145 (“[T]he rates at which federal judges—at all levels—leave active status are largely
unaffected by either political or institutional environment . . . .”).
22. Of course, a person who retires at age ninety, as Justice Stevens did, could hardly be
said to be taking early retirement in any other profession. As noted, however, over the course of
Supreme Court history, Justices have rarely retired before they were forced to do so by
declining health. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 371(c) (2006); see also Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. COURTS, http://
www.uscourts.gov/Common/FAQS.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (“Beginning at age 65, a
judge may retire at his or her current salary or take senior status after performing 15 years of
active service as an Article III judge (65+15 = 80). A sliding scale of increasing age and
decreasing service results in eligibility for retirement compensation at age 70 with a minimum of
10 years of service (70+10=80). Senior judges, who essentially provide volunteer service to the
courts, typically handle about 15 percent of the federal courts’ workload annually.”). By its
language, this statute expressly applies to Justices, as well as judges on the lower federal courts.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 371(a).
25. To be eligible for judicial pay raises, retired Justices must annually perform at least the
same amount of work that an active judge would perform in three months, or other work for the
courts as specified in detail under the statutory scheme. Id. § 371(e).
26. For example, Justice O’Connor interviewed Justice Stevens in Newsweek at the end of
2010. Sandra Day O’Connor Interviews John Paul Stevens, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 27, 2010/Jan. 3,
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28

or otherwise serve on commissions; they speak out on issues related
29
to the judiciary and beyond; and they sit by designation on the lower
federal courts. One retired Justice even acted in a Hollywood movie,
30
portraying, as might be expected, a famous Justice from history.

2011, at 38. Justice Souter gave the 2010 Harvard commencement speech. Linda Greenhouse,
Justice Souter’s Class, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (June 3, 2010, 9:47 PM), http://opinionator.
blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/justice-souters-class. Justice O’Connor speaks extensively on
judicial independence and sponsors an effort to spur civics education. See The Sandra Day
O’Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary Has Concluded, GEORGETOWN LAW, http://www.
law.georgetown.edu/judiciary (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (detailing some of Justice O’Connor’s
activities); see also ICIVICS, http://www.icivics.org (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (game-playing civics
site envisioned by O’Connor).
27. For example, retired Justice Stewart taught a class for Paul Gewirtz, Potter Stewart
Professor of Constitutional Law at Yale Law School. Professor Gewirtz recalled:
After the Justice retired from the Court, and I had started teaching at Yale, I invited
him to visit his old law school and teach a class in my course on “Antidiscrimination
Law.” He came and taught a controversial affirmative action case in which he had
recently dissented, and was a great success.
Paul Gewirtz, Essay, On “I Know It When I See It,” 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1023 n.† (1996). Justice
O’Connor is listed as a faculty member at the law school that carries her name at Arizona State
University. Faculty Index, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR COLL. OF LAW, http://apps.law.asu.edu/
Apps/Faculty/FacultyIndex.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). During the summer of 2010, Justice
O’Connor participated in a University of Virginia Semester at Sea conference, which took place
on a cruise from Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, to Halifax, Nova Scotia. Forum on Global Engagement
To Feature Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Activist/Historian Julian Bond, SEMESTER AT SEA
(June 2, 2010), http://www.semesteratsea.org/what-s-new-at-sas-/press-releases/forum-on-globalengagement-to-feature-justice-sandra-o-connor-and-activist/historian-julian-bond.php.
28. For example, Chief Justice Burger chaired the U.S. Constitution Bicentennial
Commission, Charles N. Quigley, Civic Education: Recent History, Current Status, and the
Future, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1425, 1447 (1999); Justice White chaired the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate
Caseload and Its Processing, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 287, 288 (2006); and Justice O’Connor sat on the
Iraq Study Group, David E. Sanger, G.O.P.’s Baker Hints Iraq Plan Needs Change, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2006, at A1.
29. Chief Justice Warren worked with the group World Peace Through Law in his
retirement. He also spoke against the creation of a National Court of Appeals. JIM NEWTON,
JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 508–10 (2006). Justice
O’Connor has not minced words over her feelings on judicial elections. James Podgers,
O’Connor on Judicial Elections: ‘They’re Awful. I Hate Them,’ A.B.A. J. (May 9, 2009, 8:09 AM
CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/oconnor_chemerinsky_sound_warnings_at_aba_
conference_about_the_dangers_of_s. And, according to one judge who has been extremely
active since taking senior status roughly a quarter-century ago, retired judges should write more
than they do. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, All Right, Retired Judges, Write!, 8 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 227, 228 (2006) (“And this is the recommendation that I make for every retired
judge—trial or appellate, state or federal: Make yourselves heard on scholarly issues.”).
30. Justice Blackmun appeared as Justice Story in the Steven Spielberg film AMISTAD
(DreamWorks SKG 1997). TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, HARRY A. BLACKMUN: THE OUTSIDER
JUSTICE 330–33 (2008).
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Retired Justices have notably been absent, however, from an
obvious form of service, one that retired federal district and circuit
court judges routinely perform: sitting by designation on their own
Court—that is, the Supreme Court—when it is shorthanded. The
reason for their absence—the lack of statutory authority for them to
sit on the Court after retirement, even in special circumstances—has
been the object of several reform proposals over the years, most
31
notably the Leahy bill.
Seen from one perspective, any proposal to lengthen the period
of service of Supreme Court Justices swims against the tide.
Politicians and scholars have sought to impose term or age limits on
32
Supreme Court Justices, either through constitutional amendment
33
or, more controversially, by statute. These proposals aim to remedy
34
35
overpoliticization, “mental decrepitude,” ossification, excessive

31. Several bills authorizing the recall of Supreme Court Justices were introduced in the
78th Congress (1943–1944) after a small handful of Supreme Court cases were dismissed for lack
of a quorum. See H.E. Cunningham, Editorial Note, The Problem of the Supreme Court
Quorum, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 185–89 (1944) (discussing several such proposals). The
possibility was also discussed in 1954 when Congress considered several resolutions proposing
constitutional amendments to change the composition and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
See generally Composition and Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Hearing on S.J. Res. 44 Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 27 (1954); Composition and Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court: Hearing on S.J. Res. 44, H.R.J. Res. 194, H.R.J. Res. 27 & H.R.J. Res. 91 Before
Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 26 (1954).
32. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court:
Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 824 (2006) (“We propose
that . . . Congress and the states should pass a constitutional amendment imposing an eighteenyear, staggered term limit on the tenure of Supreme Court Justices.”); David J. Garrow, Mental
Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Co[u]rt: The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 995, 1034–41 (2000) (detailing, among other proposals, Senator Butler’s push for a
constitutional amendment mandating that Justices retire at age 75).
33. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court Renewal Act: A
Return to Basic Principles, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES 467, 471 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) (“One Justice or Chief
Justice, and only one, shall be appointed during the first session of Congress after each federal
election . . . . If an appointment under this Subsection results in the availability of more than
nine Justices, the nine who are junior in commission shall sit regularly on the Court.”). But see
Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 32, at 855–68 (arguing that such a statute would be
unconstitutional).
34. See Akhil Reed Amar & Steven G. Calabresi, Term Limits for the High Court, WASH.
POST, Aug. 9, 2002, at A23 (“Currently each justice is tempted to time his or her departure with
one eye on the political calendar and one finger in the political wind. . . . Perverse incentives
also exist at the other end of the age spectrum: Life tenure encourages presidents to nominate
young candidates with minimal paper trails and maximal potential to shape the future.”).
35. ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 240 (2003).
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countermajoritarianism, and other perceived ills that purportedly
36
result from life tenure.
We take no position here on the wisdom of life tenure or on the
constitutionality of those proposals that would restrict it without a
formal constitutional amendment. Instead, we assume that life tenure
will remain for the foreseeable future, and, given that fact, we ask
what roles retired Justices can fruitfully play, including whether they
might constitutionally and practically serve by designation on their
own Court after retirement from active service.
II. THE “PROBLEM” AND POTENTIAL SOLUTION
A. Background: The “Rehnquist/Stevens” Proposal
As time passes, the case for the Leahy bill loses strength. Soon,
the cases on which Justice Kagan worked as solicitor general will all
have worked their way through the system, and the number of
recusals will revert to its usual handful per term. Still, the issue may
well arise again.
Indeed, the history of the current proposal illustrates the
recurring nature of the underlying problem. When we interviewed
retired Justice Stevens on the subject, he told us that many years
earlier he and then-Chief Justice Rehnquist had originally conceived
of what became the Leahy bill, but at the time they were unable to
persuade any of their colleagues to ask Congress for authorizing
37
legislation. Upon retiring, Justice Stevens attempted to revive the
38
idea by suggesting it to Senator Leahy.

36. See id. at 240–47 (noting that the “debate about life tenure” is “longstanding” and
describing several past proposals to limit the tenure of the Justices).
37. Telephone Interview with John Paul Stevens, supra note 7; see also HARRY A.
BLACKMUN AS INTERVIEWED BY HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN
ORAL HISTORY PROJECT 352 (1997), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/blackmun-public/
page.html?FOLDERID=D0901&SERIESID=D09 (“During that term—it might have been
during the ‘86 term—Justice Stevens suggested that Congress should be asked to legislate to
provide for a retired justice to sit in place in a vacancy that happened for a particular case. If a
justice was recused or ill or the Court was reduced to eight for a period, the legislation would
have enabled a retired justice to fill the vacancy so that there were always nine on a case. The
Court did not support this. I’m not sure I know the reasons why. In any event, Congress did not
enact it.”); Letter from John Paul Stevens to William H. Rehnquist (Oct. 28, 1998), in WARD,
supra note 35, app. C at 255–57 (continuing a prior oral discussion about “the possibility of
requesting Congress to enact legislation authorizing [the Court] to invite a retired justice to sit
[on the Court] on cases in which [they] do not have a full Court”).
38. Telephone Interview with John Paul Stevens, supra note 7.
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The primary motive of Justice Stevens and Chief Justice
39
Rehnquist was to avoid 4–4 vote splits, and the timing of the Leahy
proposal strongly suggests that Senator Leahy had the same intent.
We would define the “retired Justices problem” more broadly. In
fact, as explained in Section C, the 4–4 split may not be a real
problem. But even if the original reasons for the proposal do not
themselves warrant a change, there may well be other significant
benefits from permitting retired Justices to serve on the Court as
substitutes for recused Justices.
Retired Justices are a valuable human resource—however small
and elite the group making up that resource might be—and one that
40
is underutilized under the existing statutory scheme. This problem
may be solved in part by the Leahy bill, but other solutions may also
be appropriate. In considering the roles that retired Justices might
appropriately play, this Part also discusses how to structure incentives
to encourage retired Justices to continue to serve the public.
B. Retirement’s Costs
In some ways, a Justice’s decision to retire resembles a
retirement decision in any other profession, and, in many respects,
the outcome is the same. The Court temporarily loses some ability to
disperse its workload. The seat loses someone with experience and
expertise that is almost invariably unmatched—at least at first—by
her replacement’s.
But the retirement of a Supreme Court Justice differs from other
retirements. Unlike employees in other professions, Justices retire
and then remain completely disengaged from the Supreme Court
decisionmaking process. For professionals from physicians to athletes
to corporate executives, even for lawyers in top firms, retirement
usually means continued engagement—if not directly, at least as a
41
consultant. Retired oncologists and Hall of Fame coaches may
remain available to review difficult files, assist in tough cases, or offer

39. See id. (remarking that there would be a “[c]lear advantage in having there be a 5–4
split, [which would] get the conflict resolved”).
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (2006) (outlining the procedure for assigning retired judges and
Justices to perform judicial duties in the lower courts and noting that no designations or
assignments “shall be made to the Supreme Court”).
41. See Neal E. Cutler, Working in Retirement: The Longevity Perplexities Continue, J. FIN.
SERVICE PROFESSIONALS, July 2011, at 19, 21 (analyzing survey data to show that a quarter of
respondents ages sixty-five to seventy-five reported that they were both retired and working).
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their expertise for a fee to whoever needs it, wherever they might be,
but particularly to their former employers.
And, to be certain, the decision to continue serving as a
consultant need not be motivated by financial remuneration, because
42
by retirement most professionals are financially secure. Rather, they
43
assist both because they can and because they enjoy the work.
Yet when it comes to Supreme Court Justices—some of the most
accomplished, experienced, dedicated professionals in the country—
this option to remain a “player” is not available. Thus, the ineligibility
of retired Justices to serve on the Supreme Court carries at least one
obvious cost: it contributes to the atrophy of a valuable human
resource, even when retired Justices remain active in other respects.
C. Avoiding 4–4 Splits
Although loss of human capital may be the broad problem
occasioned by Justices’ retirements, proposals to permit them to
return and “pinch hit” typically target a more specific issue: 4–4 splits
due to recusals. When the Court divides evenly—in Court parlance,
“affirms by an equally divided Court”—the lower court’s ruling
44
stands, but no precedent is set. An analysis of any proposal along
42. Whether Supreme Court Justices are financially secure upon retirement will vary from
case to case, notwithstanding the fact that Justices earn their full judicial salaries for life. See 28
U.S.C. § 371(a) (2006) (“Any justice or judge of the United States appointed to hold office
during good behavior may retire from the office after attaining the age and meeting the service
requirements . . . and shall, during the remainder of his lifetime, receive an annuity equal to the
salary he was receiving at the time he retired.”). As Chief Justice Roberts has noted in his
annual Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, judicial salaries are quite low as compared to
those of other high-profile lawyers. See, e.g., JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2008 YEAR-END REPORT
ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7 (2008), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/
year-end/2008year-endreport.pdf (“I suspect many are tired of hearing it, and I know I am tired
of saying it, but I must make this plea again—Congress must provide judicial compensation that
keeps pace with inflation.”).
43. See Michael C. Dorf, Some Possible Hidden Complications of a Senate Proposal To
Permit Retired Justices To Pinch-Hit for Their Recused Colleagues, FINDLAW (Oct. 6, 2010),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20101006.html (commenting on how Justices O’Connor and
Stevens have “expressed an interest in hearing cases by designation on [the] Court” and how
“[e]ach of them remains mentally razor-sharp”).
44. Scholars have discussed whether letting a lower court decision stand is, in fact, a
problem. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Why We Call the Supreme Court “Supreme”: A Case Study
on the Importance of Settling the National Law, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 129, 130–31 (2001) (arguing
that affirmance by an equally divided Court fails to settle important issues); Hartnett, supra
note 9, at 678 (“[T]here is good reason to retain the clear and long-established practice of the
Supreme Court of the United States to affirm when, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
it finds itself evenly divided as to the judgment.”); William L. Reynolds & Gordon G. Young,
Equal Divisions in the Supreme Court: History, Problems, and Proposals, 62 N.C. L. REV. 29, 56
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the lines of the Leahy bill should therefore consider how serious a
45
problem the 4–4 split really is.
In quantitative terms, the answer appears to be “not very.” On
average, more than one-third of Supreme Court cases are decided
46
47
unanimously. For example, in October Term 2009, forty of eighty48
six cases resulted in unanimous decisions. Out of the cases that are
49
not decided unanimously, most are decided 8–1, 7–2, or 6–3.
Therefore, although the general public may have the perception that
most cases split the Court 5–4—often along ideological lines with
50
Justice Kennedy casting the swing vote —5–4 votes in fact constitute
51
a small percentage of the Court’s decided cases. And even among

(1983) (“Th[e] practice [of affirming without opinion when the Court is split] has the virtue only
of simplicity, failing to address either the Justices’ obligations to the litigants or to other
branches of government.”); Jason Mazzone, 4–4 Is Fine, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 8, 2010, 1:59
PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/10/4-4-is-fine.html (“The only effect of a 4–4 outcome is
that the lower court decision stands. That can’t be a problem because it’s the result that occurs
in the hundreds of cases the Court declines to hear each term. And it’s the result in the millions
of cases that the Court is not even asked to review.”).
45. Note that Senator Leahy himself identified 4–4 splits as the chief harm that his bill
sought to remedy, saying, “Given the Court’s recent rash of 5:4 rulings, the absence of one
Justice could result in a 4:4 decision.” Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy Proposes
Bill To Allow Retired Justices To Sit on Court by Designation (Sept. 29, 2010), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=D8C57B55-3988-4E00-BDE7-13459F4
AB540.
46. See Final Stats OT09, SCOTUSBLOG, 4 (July 7, 2010), http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/07/Final-Stats-OT09-0707101.pdf (citing statistics for October Term 2006
(38 percent of cases decided unanimously), October Term 2007 (30 percent decided
unanimously), October Term 2008 (33 percent decided unanimously), and October Term 2009
(47 percent decided unanimously)). For all four reported terms, more cases were decided
unanimously than by a 5–4 vote split. Id.
47. As of this writing, October Term 2009 is the most recent full term for which there is
data.
48. Final Stats OT09, supra note 46, at 4.
49. See id. (citing statistics for October Term 2006 (12 percent of cases decided 8–1, 12
percent decided 7–2, 4 percent decided 6–3), October Term 2007 (8 percent of cases decided 8–
1, 28 percent decided 7–2, 14 percent decided 6–3), October Term 2008 (5 percent of cases
decided 8–1, 16 percent decided 7–2, 16 percent decided 6–3), and October Term 2009 (9
percent of cases decided 8–1 or 7–1, 15 percent decided 7–2, 10 percent decided 6–3)).
50. See Robert Barnes, Term Saw High Court Move to the Right, WASH. POST, July 1, 2009,
at A1 (“It is a familiar ideological split: Roberts, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel
A. Alito Jr. on one side; Stevens, Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer and Souter on the other. Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy remains in the role of the decider, finding himself in the majority more
than any other justice and siding twice as often in 5 to 4 votes with conservatives as he did with
liberals.”); Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court, Tipped by Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at
A1 (calling Kennedy “the most powerful jurist in America”).
51. In the 2009 term, the Court split 5–4 in only fourteen of the seventy-two cases in which
it issued signed merits opinions. Final Stats OT09, supra note 46, at 4 (stating that there were
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these cases, some are not split along ideological lines. In recent
years, the Court has, on average, decided fewer than one case per
53
term by a 4–4 vote as a result of a recusal.
Indeed, the problem remains quantitatively small even in an
extraordinary term, such as October Term 2010. When Justice Kagan
promised to recuse herself from roughly one-third of the Court’s
docket, the 4–4 split was still not a serious problem. Based on the
voting pattern from the October Term 2009, one of us predicted that
Justice Kagan’s recusal in roughly one-third of the Court’s cases
54
would only result in two or three 4–4 splits. As the term unfolded,
55
her decision to recuse herself resulted in two such splits. Those two
cases involved the following questions: whether the first-sale doctrine
applies only to copyrighted items that are made and distributed in the
56
United States; and whether a citizenship-transmission statute that
imposes different standards for children born out of wedlock,
depending on whether their mothers or fathers are citizens, is
57
constitutional. These are not unimportant issues, but a delay in
58
resolving them will not do serious damage.
Thus, there was hardly a compelling case for the Leahy bill based
on a need to avoid 4–4 splits even when it was proposed, much less in

sixteen 5–4 cases but including in that total two cases that were actually 5–3). But see Press
Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, supra note 45 (remarking on “the Court’s recent rash of 5:4
rulings”).
52. Five of the fourteen 5–4 decisions were not split along ideological lines. Final Stats
OT09, supra note 46, at 3.
53. See Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the “Problem” of an Equally Divided
Supreme Court, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 92 (2005) (finding an average of 0.65 4–4 splits
per term from 1986 to 2003). During the 2010 term, two cases were affirmed by an equally
divided Court. Stat Pack for October Term 2010, supra note 1, at 3.
54. Dorf, supra note 43. Moreover, the Leahy bill seems poorly suited for resolving
ideologically divisive 4–4 splits. See id. (“Based on recent experience, in roughly half of the 5–4
cases in which Justice Stevens was in the majority, the Court split on ideological grounds. Yet in
those cases, the conservative Justices might be reluctant to call on the assistance of one of their
retired colleagues. And the selection of a particular Justice could itself be fraught.”); see also
infra text accompanying notes 90–91.
55. See Stat Pack for October Term 2010, supra note 1, at 3.
56. See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2011) (mem.), aff’g mem.
per curiam by an equally divided Court 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008).
57. See Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (mem.), aff’g mem. per curiam
by an equally divided Court 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008).
58. Conversely, the Court may fail to produce a majority opinion even when no Justice is
recused. For an example from the October 2010 Term, see J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
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retrospect. As Justice Kagan’s recusal rate settles to normal, the
argument becomes weaker still.
To be sure, there have been, and will continue to be, other
periods when the Court finds itself with only eight members available,
but there is little evidence to suggest that the experience during
Justice Kagan’s first term was anomalous for such periods. Consider
the last year of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s service, during which the
Chief Justice was battling throat cancer and thus was repeatedly
unavailable for Court business. Nonetheless, based in part on the late
59
Chief Justice’s judicious marshalling of his remaining strength, no 4–
60
4 splits occurred. Large numbers of recusals or absences by future
Justices could, in principle, lead to a substantial number of 4–4 splits,
but that prospect is, for now, only hypothetical. We would be hard
pressed to disagree with Professor Jason Mazzone’s characterization
61
of the Leahy proposal as “a solution in search of a problem” —at
least so long as the proposal’s goal is understood to be transforming a
substantial number of 4–4 splits into 5–4 rulings.
Yet it could be argued that even one 4–4 split can be harmful. If
a case presented an issue of sufficient importance to warrant a grant
of certiorari in the first place, then failure to resolve the issue would
62
be harmful, regardless of the outcome. We agree that this argument
adds some force to the case for the Leahy proposal but would caution
against overstating the point for two reasons.
First, issues that are truly important to resolve are likely to recur,
and a Justice who recused herself the first time a case came before the
Court might often decide to participate the second time. Because the
new case might involve different parties or circumstances, the
Justice’s view on whether or not a conflict existed might change.
Second, the Court is unlikely to be able to utilize a substitute
Justice in precisely the cases that we have reason to think would
59. See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court,
119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 74 (2005) (noting—and criticizing—“Chief Justice Rehnquist’s decision,
when he first fell seriously ill in the fall of 2004, to participate for a time only in the decision of
cases in which his would be the deciding vote”).
60. We searched for the term “affirmed by an equally divided Court” in the Supreme
Court Westlaw database during the acute period of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s illness and
returned no results. Accord The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV.
415, 423 tbl.I(C) (2005) (denoting no 4–4 splits for the October 2004 Term).
61. Mazzone, supra note 44.
62. Cf. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is
usually more important that a rule of law be settled, than that it be settled right.”). In explaining
his support for the Leahy bill, Justice Stevens made this same claim. See supra note 39.

DORF IN FINAL

96

10/6/2011 6:42:29 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:81

result in 4–4 splits: ideologically divisive cases. In such circumstances,
the more conservative Justices would presumably hesitate to call
upon the services of a retired Justice who could swing the result in a
liberal direction, and vice versa. As we explain in our discussion of
strategic considerations, this problem is likely to persist regardless of
what mechanism is used to select the particular retired Justice to use
as a substitute at times when more than one retired Justice is
available.
In sum, 4–4 splits do not present a large problem when evaluated
in quantitative terms and, although they could present a substantial
problem qualitatively, the Leahy proposal is unlikely to do much to
solve that problem.
D. Quorums and Institutional Dynamics
Historically, proposals to permit substitutes on the Supreme
63
Court have tended to arise in response to the risk that no quorum
64
would be available to resolve an important case. But for much the
same reason that the Leahy bill is unnecessary to resolve 4–4 splits, it
is unnecessary to create a quorum: cases in which there is no quorum
very rarely arise because the reasons one Justice may have for a
recusal tend to be unconnected to the reasons for recusal of the other
65
Justices. And in the sorts of cases in which we might expect recusals

63. A quorum for Supreme Court purposes is six Justices. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); SUP. CT. R.
4.
64. See, e.g., To Change the Quorum of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing on
H.R. 2808 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 78th Cong. (1943)
(detailing hearings on a bill related to the Supreme Court’s quorum requirements).
65. Most Justices’ conflicts due to prior professional experience disappear after a year or
two on the Court, although there are exceptions. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co.,
582 F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that Justice Sotomayor was originally a member of the
Second Circuit panel for this case, which was argued on June 7, 2006, and that Sotomayor was
elevated to the Supreme Court on August 8, 2009, prior to the September 21, 2009, decision),
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010) (noting that Justice Sotomayor took no part in the
consideration or decision of the petition). When he was confirmed in 1967, after serving as
solicitor general, Justice Marshall recused himself in sixty-one cases, fifty-three of which were
related to his work as solicitor general. Mark Walsh, A Changing Landscape: In First Court with
Three Women, All Eyes Are on Justice Kagan, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2010, at 24, 25 (quoting Supreme
Court practitioner Thomas C. Goldstein). Thereafter, Justice Marshall’s prior service as solicitor
general rapidly ceased to warrant recusal, but throughout his career on the Court, he recused
himself “in all cases involving two organizations with which he had long been associated—the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the NAACP Legal Defense
(later ‘and Education’) Fund.” Ross E. Davies, The Reluctant Recusants, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 79,
80 (2006). Once on the Court, most Justices work actively to avoid situations which might create
conflicts and lead to recusals. See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Duff Wilson, Justices To Examine Rights
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to be correlated—such as disputes over judicial pay or cases that
involve so many corporate parties that multiple Justices can be
expected to have a financial stake or a substantial prior relationship
66
with at least one of them —retired Justices would probably also
recuse themselves. In these circumstances, the so-called “rule of
necessity” should be a sufficient safeguard for ensuring that
67
important cases are heard.
To be sure, one can imagine tragic circumstances in which
multiple vacancies might cripple the Court. A plague, terrorist attack,
or fatal accident that simultaneously killed or disabled multiple
Justices, for example, could impair the Court’s ability to function. But
such a tragedy would call for a much more robust and targeted
response than the one contemplated by the Leahy bill.
In the ordinary course of events, the Justices have shown a
considerable capacity for accommodating one another’s career
timetables. For example, when two or more Justices have been
considering retirement in the same period, they have usually avoided
saddling the president and Senate with simultaneous vacancies. Thus,
Justice Marshall retired one year after Justice Brennan did, and
Justice Stevens retired one year after Justice Souter did. Even when
unforeseen events have outpaced the Justices’ plans—such as when
Chief Justice Rehnquist died shortly after Justice O’Connor had
announced her retirement, thus creating two simultaneous
vacancies—the Court and the political system have quickly adjusted.
On that occasion, President Bush redesignated the nomination of
John Roberts from the O’Connor seat to the Chief Justice’s chair.
Roberts was confirmed in time for the start of the new term, while

of Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2010, at A20 (citing Chief Justice Roberts’s selling of
Pfizer stock so that he could participate in two cases the company had before the Court). But cf.
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (order denying motion to recuse)
(declining to recuse himself after some commentators suggested that his duck-hunting trip with
Vice President Cheney, the petitioner in the case, raised a potential conflict).
66. See Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008) (mem.) (describing a
case in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito took no part in the
consideration or decision of the petition).
67. The “rule of necessity” provides that even if a judge or Justice has an interest in a case,
she must hear and decide the case if it otherwise cannot be heard. See, e.g., United States v.
Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213–16 (1980) (describing the origin of the “rule of necessity”).
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O’Connor retained her seat pending the confirmation of her own
68
eventual successor.
What about cases in which only one, two, or three Justices are
recused? Although the substitution of a retired Justice for a recused
Justice would not be necessary to reach a quorum, it might have
secondary effects on the dynamics of the Court at oral argument and
69
in conference. Particularly in a small, close-knit group that works
together for a number of years, having a group of eight rather than
nine might well present a different kind of problem and raise a
different kind of question: Do we value the conversation among nine
Justices to the extent that having only eight, or only seven, or even
only six diminishes the quality of the process and devalues the
70
resulting decision, even when a majority prevails?
Undoubtedly, deliberations among a Court of six would be
somewhat different from deliberations among a Court of nine,
71
although it is difficult to say exactly how. In any event, a seriously
shorthanded Court occurs with sufficient infrequency to suggest that
72
this situation, too, is generally not a problem.

68. Thus, the Court was not shorthanded, even though it took three nominees to fill
O’Connor’s seat: Roberts; then, upon his move to Chief Justice, Harriet Miers; and, following
the withdrawal of her nomination, Samuel Alito. GARRETT & RUTKUS, supra note 15, at 4–7.
69. See, e.g., Clifford May, On Judges and Justice: Byron White Reflects on Court and
Critics, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 30, 1996, at 69A, reprinted in DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE
MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE app. C at
467 (1998) (“[E]very time a new justice comes to the Supreme Court, it’s a different court.”
(quoting Justice White)).
70. Cf. Berkolow, Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent Amidst the Cacophony
of Concurrences, and Re-Percolation After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 299, 329 n.142
(2008) (“While this is troubling in the fractured opinion settling [sic], we do not tend to draw
distinctions between a close majority (5–4) and a stronger majority (8–1) in terms of ascribing
precedential weight. Even unanimous decisions are not necessarily valued any differently as
precedent.”).
71. Although we cannot observe the Court’s deliberations, we can look to research about
how juries deliberate for guidance. For a summary of the large volume of research on the effect
of jury size on deliberations, see Dennis J. Devine, Laura D. Clayton, Benjamin B. Dunford,
Rasmy Seying & Jennifer Pryce, Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 624–64 (2001). See also Ballew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232–39 (1978) (plurality opinion) (citing research in an effort to
determine what size jury is necessary to guarantee the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury
in criminal cases).
72. Even between 1946 and 2003, when the overall recusal rate was substantially higher
than it has been recently (excepting Justice Kagan’s first year on the Court), at least eight
Justices participated in almost 97 percent of the Court’s cases. See Black & Epstein, supra note
53, at 90 n.59 (explaining the results and methodology of an empirical study of the use of
discretionary recusals).
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E. Strategic Considerations Under the Leahy Bill
The foregoing Sections show that the Court would only rarely
benefit substantially from the services of a retired Justice substituting
for a recused or otherwise absent Justice. And even in those cases in
which such a substitution might be thought beneficial, problems
remain.
73
With recusal at the discretion of each Justice, a Justice makes a
difficult decision in each case that might warrant recusal. Although
74
Justices seek to avoid the appearance of impropriety, whether a
failure to recuse gives rise to such an appearance is often debatable.
75
Because the Court is largely impervious to criticism in such cases,
because Justices would almost certainly recuse themselves in clear-cut
conflict situations, and because impeachment is the only available
76
remedy for clearly unethical decisions not to recuse, Justices are
largely unaccountable for their recusal decisions.
Consider, then, the following hypothetical example: A petitioner
asks the Court to grant certiorari in a controversial case, one which
might well divide the Court 5–4. As the petition begins to make its
way through the Court’s review process, one Justice notes that she
77
may have a conflict requiring recusal.
As the law now stands, in making her recusal decision, that
Justice must consider whether the potential conflict would affect her
ability to decide the case neutrally and whether the conflict might

73. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006); see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915–16
(2004) (Scalia, J.) (order denying motion to recuse) (arguing by implication that the decision to
recuse when the rules do not clearly dictate recusal is up to each individual Justice).
74. See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the
Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 123–24 (2004) (discussing
Justice Scalia’s recusal in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004), a
Ninth Circuit case that he had criticized prior to the Supreme Court’s hearing the case); cf.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007) (“A judge shall uphold and promote the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety.”).
75. See Cheney, 541 U.S. at 923 (arguing that Justices should not recuse themselves merely
because “a significant portion of the press” demands it).
76. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”).
77. Because recusal almost always occurs before the Justices discuss the certiorari petition
at conference, a Justice must make the decision about whether to recuse herself before she
knows whether four of her colleagues will vote to grant certiorari. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 1133 (2010) (granting the petition for a writ of certiorari and
noting that “Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition”).
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78

create the appearance of impropriety. But were Congress to
authorize the substitution of a retired Justice to fill the vacancy, she
might well consider one additional factor: which retired Justice might
79
take her place in deciding the case were she to recuse herself.
Why? Because if the Justice would likely be part of a five-Justice
majority, then her recusal would reduce the votes on her side of the
issue to four. Were a Justice of a different ideological ilk to take her
place, the majority—and the opportunity to set precedent in a
controversial area of the law—would go to the other side.
So what is a Justice in this position to do? At a formal and
conscious level, the answer is clear: the Justice should decide whether
80
to recuse without regard to such collateral consequences. But as

78. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)–(b). According to Senator Leahy, some Justices might choose not to
recuse themselves simply because their absences from the cases might create a 4–4 split. See
Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, supra note 45 (“Retired Justices may be designated to sit
on any court in the land except the one to which they were confirmed . . . . The bill I am
introducing today will ensure that the Supreme Court can continue to serve its essential
function. In recent history, Justices have refused to recuse themselves and one of their
justifications has been that the Supreme Court is unlike lower courts because no other judge can
serve in their place when Justices recuse.”); see also Cheney, 541 U.S. at 915 (“Let me respond,
at the outset, to Sierra Club’s suggestion that I should ‘resolve any doubts in favor of recusal.’
That might be sound advice if I were sitting on a Court of Appeals. There, my place would be
taken by another judge, and the case would proceed normally. On the Supreme Court, however,
the consequence is different: The Court proceeds with eight Justices, raising the possibility that,
by reason of a tie vote, it will find itself unable to resolve the significant legal issue presented by
the case.” (citations omitted)); Black & Epstein, supra note 53, at 75–81 (describing the
commonly held sentiment among Supreme Court Justices that the possibility of a split-decision
should weigh into a Justice’s determination of whether or not to recuse herself); An Open
Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1033, 1039 (2004) (“In
interpreting this provision, one should distinguish the situation of a district judge or a court of
appeals judge, from that of a Supreme Court Justice. A case such as the one you mentioned
would be an easy call for a judge who was replaceable, for example, a court of appeals judge on
a three-judge panel. If there were any doubt, that judge could step out and let one of her
colleagues replace her. But on the Supreme Court, if one of us is out, that leaves eight, and the
attendant risk that we will be unable to decide the case, that it will divide evenly. Some think
that a recusal in the Supreme Court is equivalent to a vote against the petitioner. When cases
divide evenly, we affirm the decision below automatically. Because there’s no substitute for a
Supreme Court Justice, it is important that we not lightly recuse ourselves.”).
79. Note that Senator Leahy himself did not view this problem as likely to arise. Barring
retired Justices from pitching in “defies common sense,” he maintained, while their availability
“would encourage sitting justices to recuse themselves when there is even an appearance of a
conflict of interest.” Jess Bravin, Welcome Back, Souter (and O’Connor and Stevens), WALL ST.
J. WASH. WIRE (Sept. 29, 2010, 1:04 PM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/09/29/
welcome-back-souter-and-oconnor-and-stevens.
80. Justice Stevens is emphatic that Justices must recuse themselves when recusal rules so
dictate, without regard for strategic considerations including the possibility of a 4–4 split. See
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human beings, Justices are subject to all of the same cognitive biases
as everyone else, so they can be expected to make close recusal
decisions under the influence of their strategic perceptions of the
81
consequences for the merits. Even if only unconsciously, a Justice
might choose not to recuse herself under a rotation system, in which
she knew exactly which retired Justice was next in line to fill an empty
seat, or under a random system, in which a Justice was to be chosen at
random but the odds were unfavorable for an ideological ally to be
the choice. Likewise, she might choose not to recuse herself in a
system like the one suggested by Justice Stevens, in which a retired
82
Justice would be slotted in based on his or her legal expertise, if that
Justice’s views on the issue in the case were well known, or at least
easily anticipated, and did not align with the potentially recused
83
Justice’s own.
Strategic decisionmaking would not necessarily be limited to
cases in which a sitting Justice was recused. Sitting Justices would
always be aware that their retired colleagues could become unretired
for the purposes of some case down the road. With that prospect in
mind, a Justice might not choose to overrule a case in which a retired
colleague wrote the majority because she might need that colleague’s
vote in a future case down the road. Although the Court’s culture
does not allow explicit logrolling, that fact does not mean that Justices
84
never consider one another’s presumed preferences.

Telephone Interview with John Paul Stevens, supra note 7 (“Standards of recusal are totally
independent of what would occur after recusal.”).
81. For insight into how the thinking behind this strategic decisionmaking might work, see
generally Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954).
82. Justice Stevens offered the example of recalling Justice Blackmun when the Court was
shorthanded on tax cases, had the proposal been in effect between Justice Blackmun’s
retirement and death. Telephone Interview with John Paul Stevens, supra note 7; see generally
Robert A. Green, Justice Blackmun’s Federal Tax Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109
(1998) (describing Justice Blackmun’s experience in writing tax opinions).
83. Strategic opportunities become even more obvious under the language of the proposed
law. According to the Leahy bill, “a majority of active justices vote to designate and assign that
retired Chief Justice or Associate Justice.’’ S. 3871, 111th Cong. sec. 1, § 2(b) (2010). Therefore,
according to the bill’s plain language, when choosing a retired Justice to fill the seat of a recused
Justice, the selection would not be random. Instead, the eight remaining sitting Justices would
choose the retired Justice who would substitute. Therefore, the four Justices who vote to grant
certiorari could push for a particular retired Justice to sit in, and they would effectively win the
case before it is even argued.
84. Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 607 (2003) (“It is often observed—correctly—that logrolling
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F. Administrability
The Leahy proposal leaves open many issues of administration:
Would the retired Justice write opinions? Would she participate in
the conference at which certiorari is granted if the recusal occurred
before certiorari were granted? Would she share her one law clerk
with another chambers for that particular case, or would a screening
mechanism be adopted to prevent the retired Justice’s law clerk from
acting as a conduit of information between chambers? Would that
85
one clerk take on a disproportionate amount of work as compared
to the chambers of sitting Justices, where four clerks routinely
86
serve? If there were only one living retired Justice, as was the case,
87
for example, when Justice O’Connor retired, would the proposal
require that individual to serve as a substitute in every case in which a
sitting Justice recused herself, even if, as in October Term 2010, that
would mean participating in one-third of the Court’s caseload for the
88
term?
Beyond the practicalities of implementing a substitution system,
as we have already suggested, the system itself would require a
mechanism to select which retired Justice would serve when multiple
retired Justices were available. The two most obvious approaches are
random selection and strict rotation. A strict rotation system could
lead to some of the problems already discussed, with Justices, at least
subconsciously, making recusal decisions and voting on whether to
substitute a retired Justice based in part on how the particular
substitute would be likely to vote on the merits. The same problem
arises out of a different proposal suggested to us by Justice Stevens—

is prohibited under the decisional norms of the Supreme Court, but it is impossible to erase
considerations of good will entirely from human behavior.” (footnote omitted)).
85. In addition to drafting opinions, law clerks in many chambers routinely, inter alia,
participate in the certiorari pool, write bench memos, help prepare their Justice for conference
and oral argument, work on petitions for stays of executions, and write speeches. See generally
TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006) (describing the multi-faceted responsibilities of Supreme
Court clerks).
86. EUGENE GRESSMAN, KENNETH S. GELLER, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, TIMOTHY S.
BISHOP & EDWARD A. HARTNETT, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 37 (9th ed. 2007).
87. The same was also true when several other Justices retired, as well as for many Justices
who left the Court in the years before retirement was possible. See, e.g., ATKINSON, supra note
12, at 80 (describing the retirement of Justice Moody).
88. The Supreme Court decided eighty-two merits cases during the 2010 term. Stat Pack for
October Term 2010, supra note 1, at 27. Justice Kagan was recused in twenty-eight, Chief Justice
Roberts in one, and Justice Sotomayor in two. Id. at 43–51.
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using an “expert” retired Justice in a case involving specialized
89
expertise.
According to the Leahy bill, a majority of active Justices would
have to vote to substitute a retired Justice for a recused one. If
90
Justices voted for or against a particular Justice, then the mechanism
would almost surely fail in precisely those cases in which it might be
thought most useful: predictably ideologically divisive 4–4 splits. The
decision to bring in a particular Justice would be made with
knowledge of the outcome to which that Justice’s participation would
91
likely lead. That fact, in turn, suggests that no substitution would
occur in ideologically divisive cases or that some other system of
selection would have to be used.
For these reasons, we think that a lottery system would likely be
deemed most practicable, although with a small number of retired
Justices at any given time, strategic factors could still play a role. For
example, the three Justices that were retired in 2011—Justice Stevens,
Justice O’Connor, and Justice Souter—were all more liberal on most
issues than the median Justice—Justice Kennedy. Thus, under
these—and most foreseeable—circumstances, just about any selection
method could give rise to strategic behavior.
We do not mean to suggest that the foregoing objections are
impossible to answer, but merely that no answer will be perfect or
even mostly satisfactory. Indeed, it is not even clear what mechanism
would be used to provide the answers: All of these issues could be
resolved in an amended version of the Leahy bill, but for Congress to
specify too much about what is in substantial measure a matter of the
Court’s internal decisional processes could be seen as a threat to
separation of powers. Within the Court, such matters could be
resolved by any number of mechanisms, including the promulgation
by a majority of the Court of an amendment to the Supreme Court
89. See supra note 82.
90. The bill is unclear as to whether the Justices would vote to substitute a particular
retired Justice or just a retired Justice in general. By its plain language, it would appear to
suggest that a particular Justice would somehow come before the conference for a vote (“a
majority of active justices vote to designate and assign that retired Chief Justice or Associate
Justice”), but the bill does not specify how that Justice would be selected. S. 3871, 111th Cong.
sec. 1, § 2 (2010).
91. The Leahy bill is also unclear in defining exactly who constitutes the majority, saying
only “a majority of active justices vote to designate and assign that retired Chief Justice or
Associate Justice.” Id. Would the “majority” number include the recused Justice, meaning that
only four Justices involved in the case would have to vote to substitute in the retired Justice? Or
would the number include only the eight Justices involved in the case?
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92

Rules. Alternatively, the Court could adopt an internal practice for
the selection of retired Justice substitutes without codifying that
93
practice in any formal rule, presumably by consensus. The
procedure adopted for choosing a method of selecting retired Justices
could in turn affect what method would be chosen.
*

*

*

There appears to be no pressing need for retired Justices to
substitute for recused or otherwise absent Justices, and the adoption
of a scheme permitting such substitutions could give rise to strategic
behavior and implementation difficulties. Even so, these concerns,
although serious, are not so grave as to render proposals along the
lines of the Leahy bill complete nonstarters. As noted at the
beginning of this Part, retired Justices are a valuable resource whose
continued engagement in Supreme Court decisionmaking could
provide genuine, if modest, benefits.
III. IS THE LEAHY PROPOSAL CONSTITUTIONAL?
Based on the foregoing considerations, we think the case for the
Leahy bill is at best uncertain. Nonetheless, others may weigh the
costs and benefits differently. For those who conclude that the
proposal, on balance, deserves support, a further issue arises: Is it
constitutional? This Part considers the constitutional limits on the
ability of Congress to authorize retired Justices to perform judicial
duties. Although there is a nonfrivolous argument that the Leahy
proposal would violate Article III’s requirement that there be “one
supreme Court,” we ultimately reject that argument. We conclude
that as long as Justices have only retired from active duty, rather than
having resigned their commissions, neither Article III nor any other
constitutional provision forbids them from serving on the Supreme
94
Court or on lower federal courts by designation.

92. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2006) (setting forth the power of the Supreme Court and the
lower courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure consistent with acts of Congress).
93. The so-called “Rule of Four” for granting a petition for a writ of certiorari is an
example of such an uncodified practice. See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 86, at 323–24
(explaining the Court’s “Rule of Four”).
94. Indeed, federal statutory law not only permits retired Justices to serve on the lower
federal courts by designation, but, subject to an exception for disabled Justices, it mandates such
service or other work for retirees who wish to receive any judicial pay raises authorized after
their retirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 371(b)–(c), (e) (2006).
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A. Service on Lower Courts
The Constitution nowhere expressly provides for the retirement
of Supreme Court Justices or Article III judges, but from the earliest
days of the Republic, it has been understood that Justices and judges
95
can resign their commissions. Most prominently, John Jay, the first
Chief Justice, left his seat on the Court to become governor of New
96
York.
Retirement differs from resignation, however. Lower court
judges who accept senior status and Supreme Court Justices who
retire but remain available to serve by designation on lower courts
97
continue to be members of the Article III judiciary. The relevant
statutory language formerly distinguished between a judge who
98
“resigns his office” and one who chooses instead to “retire.” In its
current form, however, the U.S. Code distinguishes between a judge
or Justice who chooses to “retire from the office” and one who
chooses instead to “retain the office but retire from regular active
99
service,” hearing cases only by occasional designation. For clarity
and simplicity, we use the older terminology, distinguishing between
“resignation” and “retirement.”
The notion that a retired Supreme Court Justice remains an
Article III judge was endorsed by the Supreme Court itself. In 1934,
100
in Booth v. United States, the Court held that a retired judge is—so
far as the salary-protection provision of Article III is concerned—just
101
like any other Article III judge. As a matter of doctrine, then,
Booth appears to dispose of any constitutional challenge to the
practice of retired judges’ and Justices’ providing some form of
occasional Article III judicial service.
Moreover, the reasoning in Booth remains sound. At least as far
as lower federal court judges are concerned, a retired judge is,
constitutionally speaking, just another Article III judge. Judges who
95. WARD, supra note 35, at 26.
96. HENRY B. RENWICK, LIVES OF JOHN JAY AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON 119–20 (New
York, Harper & Bros. 1841).
97. See Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339, 352 (1934) (holding that Article III bars
Congress from reducing the salary of a retired judge).
98. Id. at 348 n.1 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 375 (1926) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 371
(2006))).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 371(a)–(b)(1).
100. Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339 (1934).
101. Id. at 351 (concluding that the “status” of a retired judge when sitting by designation “is
the same as that of any active judge”).
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find themselves no longer able or willing to handle a full docket may
still have the energy to oversee a partial docket. Given the
Constitution’s silence on these matters, Congress should be permitted
to take advantage of the cost savings and accumulated wisdom that
retired judges provide.
Similarly, service by retired Supreme Court Justices on lower
federal courts appears to be constitutionally unobjectionable. As
early as 1803, the Supreme Court deemed the practice of assigning
active Justices to lower federal courts—via circuit riding—to be so
102
well established as to be beyond constitutional doubt. Admittedly,
103
the Court’s ruling in that case, Stuart v. Laird, was arguably issued
under threat of impeachment or worse from the Jeffersonian
104
Congress. But that fact makes Stuart problematic only insofar as it
upheld the abolition of judgeships; its terse analysis of the
permissibility of circuit riding appears sound.
To be sure, it is possible to parse the text of Article III to
mandate a different result by reading the terms “Offices” and
“Office” in Section 1 to imply that a judge or Justice is appointed to a
particular court only. But this is hardly a required reading. “Office”
historically has been read to mean something more generic, such as
105
“judicial office.”
And for good reason. Because an Article III judge cannot be
fired or have her salary reduced once named to the judiciary, a rigid
reading of “Office” would greatly impede Congress’s ability to adjust
the organization of the lower courts, as Congress did, for example,
when it split the former Fifth Circuit into the current Fifth and

102. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (determining that “practice and
acquiescence under” the system of circuit riding “for a period of several years, commencing with
the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the
construction” of Article III).
103. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
104. See Michael W. McConnell, The Story of Marbury v. Madison: Making Defeat Look
Like Victory, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 13, 31 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009)
(noting that the Stuart Court was “powerless to confront [the Judiciary Act repeal] directly”).
105. In Booth, the Court took a broad view of the term “office” by holding that a retired
judge or Justice retains her “office” even when she is not hearing cases. Booth, 291 U.S. at 351.
Further, the Court has concluded that Article III allows retired Supreme Court Justices to ride
circuit without requiring that they go through the confirmation process again. See supra note
102 and accompanying text. This lends support to the idea that the term “office” in section 1
refers broadly to some federal judicial office rather than to a seat on any particular Article III
court.
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Eleventh Circuits. Such a reading would also prevent Congress
from assigning judges to fulfill temporary judicial duties when the
need arises. Instead, Congress would have to create and staff new
judicial offices at substantial expense. This disincentive in turn would
put pressure on Congress to substitute administrative adjudication for
107
judicial adjudication whenever permissible.
Given the overall
purpose of Article III—to ensure an independent judiciary—a
reading of the protean term “Office” that would lead to the
circumvention of the independent judiciary should be avoided.
Accordingly, the longstanding practice of assigning retired judges and
Justices to hear cases on the lower federal courts raises no substantial
questions under Article III.
B. Article III’s Requirement of One Supreme Court
What about the proposal to permit retired Supreme Court
Justices to sit by designation on the Supreme Court itself? Here there
is at least a prima facie textual obstacle. Article III vests the judicial
108
A Court with fluctuating
power in “one supreme Court.”
membership, the objection goes, would not be “one” Supreme Court,
but several different Courts.
This constitutional objection has some substance. Thus, we do
not go quite so far as the late Justice White, who once proposed,
without even pausing to consider the text of Article III, that “[r]ather
than one Supreme Court, there might be two, one for statutory issues
and one for constitutional cases; or one for criminal and one for civil
109
cases.” Even this seemingly radical proposal might have been
110
reconcilable with Article III’s text, but at the least, it should have

106. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat.
1994 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2006)).
107. The outer limits of congressional power to assign potential Article III business to nonArticle III bodies are, to say the least, unclear, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F.
MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 363 (6th ed. 2009) (suggesting that the Supreme
Court’s cases have “brought little but confusion to this area since” 1932), but it is clear that
Congress has considerable power in this regard.
108. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
109. Byron R. White, Challenges for the U.S. Supreme Court and the Bar: Contemporary
Reflections, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 275, 281 (1982).
110. We describe two arguments for reconciling a divided Supreme Court with the
requirement of “one supreme Court.” First, we suggest that the availability of en banc review
would satisfy the requirement. See infra text accompanying notes 121–122. Second, we note how
the constitutionally “real” Supreme Court need not have jurisdiction over all cases to qualify as
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raised a prima facie worry. Nonetheless, although the matter is not
entirely free from doubt, we believe that the better reading of Article
III’s requirement of “one supreme Court” would permit retired
Justices to serve as substitutes for recused or otherwise-unavailable
Justices.
To see why, consider a related question: Could Congress
authorize the Supreme Court to sit in panels, rather than in plenary
sessions? In two provocative articles, Professors Tracey George and
111
Chris Guthrie offer just such a proposal. They argue that a move to
panels, accompanied by an increase in the Court’s size, would provide
112
benefits that would outweigh the costs, but they do not address the
113
constitutional objection in any detail. Instead, they assume the
validity of Supreme Court panels because Congress and others have
repeatedly considered them, because there is a longstanding practice
of single-Justice decisions, and because there is no clear prohibition in
114
the constitutional text or history.
We agree with George and Guthrie as a matter of text. Certainly
a court that regularly sits in panels—like the U.S. Court of Appeals
115
for the Second Circuit—can be understood as “one” court. But the
original understanding of Article III is somewhat more complicated.
Professor Ross Davies argues that participants in the debates at the
the “one supreme Court” in light of the Exceptions Clause. See infra text accompanying notes
122–124. Depending on how the courts’ jurisdiction was carved up, both arguments would be
available in principle to defend Justice White’s proposal.
111. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the
Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1458–65 (2009); Tracey E. George & Chris
Guthrie, “The Threes”: Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1825
(2008) [hereinafter George & Guthrie, “The Threes”].
112. See George & Guthrie, “The Threes,” supra note 111, at 1847 (“[W]e believe that the
benefits associated with doubling or tripling the Court’s output—even if this means that some
panel decisions would differ from decisions the Court would make as a whole, or that some of
the decisions would be of lower quality—would be worth it.”). For skepticism toward the policy
grounds for the George and Guthrie proposal, see generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Response, No
Warrant for Radical Change: A Response to Professors George and Guthrie, 58 DUKE L.J. 1691
(2009).
113. See George & Guthrie, “The Threes,” supra note 111, at 1847 n.85 (“We do not
consider in this paper whether Article III’s dictate of ‘one supreme Court’ requires that all
Justices participate in all decisions.”).
114. Id.
115. The concept of multiple combinations of players making up one team is familiar from
sports. In American football, different players take the field for offense and defense; hockey
players typically take the ice in shifts; substitutes check in and out of the game in basketball; and
baseball teams routinely change at least the pitcher from one game to the next. Yet in each of
these examples we have no difficulty referring to the single team that these various
combinations of players compose.
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Philadelphia Convention assumed that “one supreme Court” meant
116
one indivisible Supreme Court. That may only show, however, that
the Framers expected the Supreme Court to be indivisible. Davies
himself acknowledges that the indivisibility question did not arise
117
during the public debate over ratification. Insofar as the original
118
understanding is the original public meaning of the document, we
are thus thrown back upon the plain text, which did not and does not
answer the question whether the “one supreme Court” must be
indivisible.
Postenactment history is also equivocal. Professor Davies
characterizes the assumption of Supreme Court indivisibility as
“consistently shared by almost all judges, bureaucrats, and scholars”
119
since the Founding. This is an overstatement, as illustrated by the
examples—both those that have been adopted and those that were
120
merely proposed—cited by Professors George and Guthrie, as well
as one example Davies discusses at length himself: from 1802 to 1839,
a single Justice was empowered to act on many matters in place of the
121
entire Supreme Court during an “August Term.”
Even if one thinks the 1802–1839 experience was a constitutional
anomaly, there remains a fatal flaw in the argument that Congress
116. See Ross E. Davies, A Certain Mongrel Court: Congress’s Past Power and Present
Potential To Reinforce the Supreme Court, 90 MINN. L. REV. 678, 685–87 (2006) (discussing this
assumption in relation to a debate at the Convention over whether Congress should have the
power to raise judicial salaries).
117. See id. at 686 (noting that, aside from the Convention debate over judicial salaries,
“[t]he ‘one supreme Court’ question was never again an issue in the framing or ratification of
the Constitution”).
118. Although neither of the present authors is an originalist in the sense of one who gives
decisive weight to the original understanding when it is clear, we both recognize the important
role of original understanding in constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf,
Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85
GEO. L.J. 1765, 1800–22 (1997) (explaining why original understanding may be relevant for
nonoriginalists). And we generally agree with those “new originalists” who argue that the
original meaning that matters most is the original public understanding rather than the
subjective expected applications of the drafters. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE
LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89 (2004) (“[T]he words of the
Constitution should be interpreted according to the meaning they had at the time they were
enacted.”).
119. Davies, supra note 116, at 687.
120. See George & Guthrie, “The Threes,” supra note 111, at 1853–55 (describing past
proposals by Congress and in foreign nations to have high courts sit in panels).
121. See Davies, supra note 116, at 696–705 (describing the single-Justice “rump Court”); see
also Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 268 n.213 (1985) (explaining that Supreme Court panels are
not anomalous unless “we confuse the historically familiar with the constitutionally necessary”).
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could not authorize the Supreme Court to conduct most of its
business in panels. So long as Supreme Court en banc review of panel
decisions were available, even a formalist reading of the “one
supreme Court” requirement would still be satisfied: The Court
sitting en banc would be the “real” indivisible Supreme Court, while
the panels could be understood as lower federal courts. The
experience of circuit riding—not to mention the service of retired
Justices on lower federal courts—validates the service of Supreme
Court Justices on lower federal courts, and nothing in Article III
prohibits Congress from creating a lower federal court staffed entirely
by Supreme Court Justices.
To be sure, en banc review would not always be available to
validate the participation of retired Justices in Supreme Court cases.
Suppose that, as now, there are two or more retired Justices available
to serve on a substitute basis, and that one active Justice is recused.
Using the designated procedure—random selection, let us say—one
of the retired Justices is chosen to replace the recused active Justice.
Now it becomes impossible to locate a single, indivisible Supreme
Court that is available for en banc review. One need not be troubled
by the absence of the recused Justice, for the possibility of recusal
surely does not undermine indivisibility. If it did, then every recusal
would violate Article III’s supposed indivisibility requirement. But
neither will the remaining retired Justice or Justices who were not
chosen as substitutes be called upon to serve on an en banc Court to
review the judgment. Consequently, it appears that one might be left
to draw the conclusion that substituting a retired Justice for an active
one violates the putative indivisibility requirement, even if the use of
Supreme Court panels would not.
But such a counterintuitive conclusion would be unwarranted. At
the very least, one can concoct a technical fix. Suppose one really
thought that Article III required that there be a single indivisible
Supreme Court. If so, Congress could denominate the active Justices
as the constitutionally required “real” Supreme Court while limiting
that body to hearing original-jurisdiction cases and a tiny fraction of
the appellate-jurisdiction cases described in Article III. Retired
Justices would then be ineligible to serve on original-jurisdiction
122
cases, of which there are precious few. Under such a scheme, the

122. The Court disposed of fifteen original-jurisdiction cases between 1999 and 2009,
averaging fewer than two per term. For the number of original-jurisdiction cases disposed of in
each term from 1999 to 2009, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT
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vast majority of the de facto Supreme Court’s appellate work—
including cases in which a retired Justice substituted for a recused or
otherwise unavailable Justice—would be conceptualized for Article
III purposes as “really” the work of a lower federal court, much in the
way that under the Judiciary Act of 1789, Justices sat on lower federal
courts while riding circuit.
The key to this odd arrangement would be that Congress has the
power to whittle away the Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Article
123
III itself, which authorizes “Exceptions.” It is even possible that
Congress could “except” all cases from the “real” Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction, but if one took the view that the very notion of
“an ‘exception’ implies some residuum of jurisdiction, Congress could
124
meet that test by excluding everything but patent cases” or some
other residual category.
We do not actually favor this clunky arrangement, but we
introduce it to show that a highly formalistic reading of “one supreme
Court” can be met by a highly formalistic reading of other provisions
of Article III. The better course, however, is to look to the functional
reality. The technical details of the argument for the constitutionality
of Supreme Court adjudication in panels are less important than the
bottom line. If so radical a change as Supreme Court panels satisfies
Article III—as it arguably does—then it should be very difficult to
find constitutional fault with a change so minor as a statute that
would permit retired Supreme Court Justices to occasionally
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 82 tbl.A-1 (2011);
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 84 tbl.A-1 (2008); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 69 tbl.A-1 (2004).
123. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make.”).
124. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364–65 (1953). Hart apparently meant this
suggestion facetiously. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 107, at 296 (assuming that “Hart’s own
view” was captured by the dialogue’s other speaker, who posits that “exceptions must not be
such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan”). The
Supreme Court itself, however, has not articulated any real limits on the Exceptions Clause
other than those that follow from the constraints on suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 575 (2006)
(noting, but not addressing, “grave questions about Congress’ authority to impinge upon this
Court’s appellate jurisdiction, particularly in habeas cases”); id. at 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(wondering “how there could be any such lurking questions, in light of the aptly named
‘Exceptions Clause’”).
OF THE
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substitute for recused or otherwise-unavailable Justices. One must
remember that Article III nowhere expressly states that the “one
supreme Court” must be indivisible, so these mental gymnastics may
not even be necessary. Thus, we ultimately find no obstacle in Article
III to service on the Court by retired Justices. Were Congress to
make a policy judgment in favor of the Leahy bill, it should pass
constitutional muster under Article III.
IV. ETHICAL CONSTRAINTS ON ADJUDICATION BY RETIRED
JUSTICES
The Leahy proposal is still not out of the woods, though, and not
just because the policy case for it is uncertain. Federal statutory
125
provisions governing disqualifications —and in rare circumstances,
126
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause —require judges and
Justices to recuse themselves from cases in which they are or may be
biased. Such recusals will typically provide the very occasion for the
substitution of a retired Justice under the Leahy proposal. In
addition, retired Justices may themselves be subject to recusal based
on the reality or appearance of a conflict of interest.
Indeed, some retired Justices may face conflicts requiring recusal
in a relatively large proportion of the cases on which they would
otherwise be asked to sit because, unlike that of active Justices, most
of a retired Justice’s time will be taken up with nonjudicial tasks,
thereby creating the potential for more occasions for recusal. By
127
speaking out on such matters as the death penalty and state judicial
125. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006). The statute expressly applies to “any justice” as well as
“any . . . judge.” Id. § 455(a). By contrast, the further ethical rules that have been adopted by the
Judicial Conference for federal judges do not apply to Supreme Court Justices. See CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES 2 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.
aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02A-Ch02.pdf (“This Code applies to United
States circuit judges, district judges, Court of International Trade judges, Court of Federal
Claims judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges.”).
126. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (“Because the
codes of judicial conduct provide more protection than due process requires, most disputes over
disqualification will be resolved without resort to the Constitution.”). Although Caperton
involved state judges and, thus, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the standard
is the same for federal judges and Justices under the Fifth Amendment. Cf. McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 (2010) (noting that the Bill of Rights generally applies the same
standards to the federal government as the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states).
127. Retired Justice Powell chaired a commission that recommended reforms of habeas
corpus in cases relating to the death penalty and beyond. See AD HOC COMM. ON FED. HABEAS
CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., COMMITTEE REPORT (1989),
reprinted in 45 Crim. L. Rep. 3239 (1989); see also O’Connor Questions Death Penalty Fairness,
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128

a publicly engaged retired Justice may develop the
elections,
appearance or reality of a bias more often than would an active
Justice who spends the lion’s share of her time on Court business.
To be sure, a retired Justice will likely spend a smaller portion of
her typical day working than she spent before retirement. That is,
after all, the usual point of retiring. Still, if the retired Justice remains
reasonably active in public life—as will typically be true of those
retired Justices willing to serve as substitutes on the Supreme
129
Court —then she likely will still spend more time on average
pursuing extrajudicial matters than before retirement.
In this Part, we ask whether retired Justices’ taking an active role
in public life is compatible with occasional service as a substitute on
the Supreme Court. After concluding that retired Justices ought to
have at least as much freedom as active Justices and other Article III
judges to perform nonjudicial functions, we ask whether the limits on
such activities ought to be relaxed for retired Justices in light of the
fact that they only occasionally serve judicial functions. Although the
cleaner answer would treat retired and active Justices identically, we
tentatively suggest that there may be some room for a wider
nonjudicial role by retired Justices.
A. Recusal of Retired Justices Under Existing Law
Current law provides what might be thought to be a fully
dispositive answer to the question of whether retired Justices can
return to hear cases. When sitting by designation on a lower federal
court, a retired Supreme Court Justice is subject to recusal in exactly
the same circumstances as those in which an active judge or Justice
would be.
The relevant statute first requires federal judges, Justices, and
magistrates to recuse themselves “in any proceeding in which [their]
130
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The statute then lists

ABC NEWS (July 3, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=92961 (reporting statements by
retired Justice O’Connor expressing reservations about the administration of the death penalty).
128. Retired Justice O’Connor has criticized the politicization of state judicial elections and
has called for states to choose their judges by a merit-based selection system. For examples of
her public statements on this issue, see Sandra Day O’Connor, Fair & Independent Courts,
DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at 8; Sandra Day O’Connor, How To Save Our Courts, PARADE, Feb.
24, 2008, at 5; and Sandra Day O’Connor, Op-Ed., Take Justice off the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May
23, 2010, at WK9.
129. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 26–30.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
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further grounds for disqualification, including a provision that will
sometimes be triggered by retired Justices who serve on government
131
panels or advisory bodies. It requires recusal when the Justice “has
served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated
as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or
expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in
132
controversy.”
Permitting retired Justices to serve on the Supreme Court as well
as on lower federal courts would not, and should not, change the
recusal standard with respect to particular cases. If a retired Justice
has a financial or other conflict that would require recusal from a
lower court case, it should require recusal from the Supreme Court
133
itself. With respect to recusal in particular cases, we see no reason
to distinguish active from retired Justices or service on the lower
federal courts from service on the Supreme Court. One has reason to
doubt the impartiality of a retired Justice with a financial interest in a
case in exactly the same way one might doubt an active judge or
Justice with such an interest, regardless of whether the judge or
Justice is sitting on a lower federal court or on the Supreme Court.
B. Retired Justices as Elder Statespersons
Beyond the requirement of recusal in particular cases, retired
Justices and, to the extent that they perform similar functions, lower
134
court judges who have taken senior status, may face conflicts that
current law discounts. The issue arises because retired Justices have
sometimes taken on the role of “elder statespersons” by serving the
country in a nonjudicial capacity.
Consider Justice O’Connor’s service following her retirement on
the Iraq Study Group, which produced analysis and concrete policy
recommendations on military and foreign-policy matters that fall
135
squarely within the purview of the political branches. We think that

131. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 135–143.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3).
133. See id. § 455(b)(4) (providing recusal standards for Justices, judges, and magistrates
based on financial interest).
134. For simplicity, the balance of this Part omits discussion of lower court judges who have
taken senior status.
135. JAMES A. BAKER, III, LEE H. HAMILTON, LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER, VERNON E.
JORDAN, JR., EDWARD MEESE III, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, LEON E. PANETTA, WILLIAM J.
PERRY, CHARLES S. ROBB & ALAN K. SIMPSON, THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT (2006),
available at http://www.usip.org/programs/initiatives/iraq-study-group.
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her service on the Iraq Study Group was proper and should not have
categorically disqualified her from continuing to serve in a judicial
capacity on the lower courts or, if authorized by a statutory change,
136
the Supreme Court. No doubt Congress named Justice O’Connor to
the group because of her demonstrated wisdom and judgment during
her distinguished career on the Court. But it is nonetheless
noteworthy that this sort of activity could be considered
137
inappropriate for an active Justice.
By way of comparison, Justice Fortas’s close relationship with
President Lyndon Johnson—which apparently included consultation
on the Vietnam War—was a factor in Fortas’s failure to secure
confirmation to the Chief Justice’s seat and his eventual resignation
138
from the Court. Those outcomes likely reflected a widespread
perception that Fortas’s extrajudicial activities were inconsistent with
his continuing service as a Justice. Likewise, although it did not come
to light at the time, Chief Justice Vinson’s informal advice to
President Truman regarding the legality of seizing the steel mills was
139
also improper.
We do not mean to say that Justice O’Connor’s activities are
indistinguishable from Justice Fortas’s or Chief Justice Vinson’s. On
the contrary, O’Connor served openly on the Iraq Study Group,
whereas Fortas and Vinson met with Presidents Johnson and Truman,
respectively, in secret. Moreover, and more to the present point,
O’Connor was retired when she served on the Iraq Study Group.
Yet if a retired Justice is simply another judge or Justice as far as
the ethical rules are concerned, does that mean that Justice O’Connor
was wrong to serve on the Iraq Study Group after all? If not, did she
thereby disqualify herself from hearing all cases by designation on a
lower court and, in the event that something like the Leahy proposal
were enacted, on the Supreme Court?

136. Justice Stevens agreed. See Telephone Interview with John Paul Stevens, supra note 7
(commenting that he saw no reason for Justice O’Connor to keep her views on social and
political issues private).
137. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.1, 3.4 (2007) (providing ethical rules
regarding extrajudicial activities and the acceptance of appointments to governmental
positions).
138. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 625
(1987) (noting that Justice Fortas was widely known to be giving advice to President Johnson on
Vietnam War issues and reelection strategy).
139. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 897 (1992) (noting that Chief Justice Vinson
confidentially advised President Truman, in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine).
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Part of the answer may be that there are only weak formal
constraints on extrajudicial activities, even for active judges and
Justices. Perhaps Justice O’Connor would have been within her rights
to serve on the Iraq Study Group even had she not retired. Certainly,
we can find historical precedents. Five Supreme Court Justices joined
ten members of Congress to compose the electoral commission that
140
resolved the contested election of 1876; Justice Jackson took a leave
of absence from, but did not give up his seat on, the Supreme Court
141
to serve as a Nuremberg prosecutor; Chief Justice Warren chaired
the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President
142
Kennedy, popularly known as the “Warren Commission”; and
Justices and judges routinely serve on such bodies as the U.S.
143
Sentencing Commission and the rules advisory committees.
Longstanding case law confirms the compatibility of such
moonlighting with holding an Article III office. Consider Chief
144
Justice Jay’s view in Hayburn’s Case.
After determining that
Congress could not constitutionally assign nonjudicial business to an
Article III court, he and the two other judges with whom he was
sitting nonetheless undertook the precise business assigned—
determining invalid veterans’ pension eligibility—“in the capacity of
145
commissioners.” That decision—and the long history of subsequent
performance of nonjudicial service by Article III judges and

140. See Jesse H. Choper, Why the Supreme Court Should Not Have Decided the Presidential
Election of 2000, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 335, 341 n.30 (2001) (“Congress appointed an electoral
commission composed of five Senators, five Representatives, and five Supreme Court
Justices.”).
141. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty To
Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 813, 845 (2009).
142. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT KENNEDY, at v (1964) (listing Chief Justice Warren as the commission’s chairman);
see also Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or
Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1137 (1994) (noting the controversy
caused by Chief Justice Warren’s appointment as chairman of the commission).
143. Justice Breyer served as a member of the U.S. Sentencing Commission from 1985–1989
when he was a judge on the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Biographies of Current
Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/biographies.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). For a list of current members of the federal
rules advisory committees, see Committees of the Judicial Conference of the United States, U.S.
COURTS (Oct. 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Committee_
Membership_Lists/2010_Committee_Members.pdf.
144. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
145. Id. at 410 n.†.
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146

Justices —suggests that perhaps there would have been nothing
objectionable about even a fully active Justice serving on a body
charged with extricating the United States from a foreign war.
Yet surely at some point there is a line beyond which one
becomes categorically ineligible to serve as a judge or Justice.
Suppose then-Justice Hughes had run for president without giving up
his seat on the Court, or more fantastically still, that he had won, and
then attempted to execute the offices of president and Supreme Court
Justice simultaneously.
There is some well-known precedent for even that degree of
moonlighting, of course. As every first-year student of constitutional
147
law learns when studying Marbury v. Madison, John Marshall
retained his position as secretary of state for some time after his
148
appointment to the Court as Chief Justice. The casebooks routinely
149
ask whether Marshall ought to have recused himself in Marbury, to
which the answer under modern recusal standards is almost certainly
“yes.” But the broader question is whether—quite apart from a bias
that may arise in any particular case—being a judge or Justice is
inconsistent with some other jobs.
The constitutional text is at best silent on this issue. Indeed, it
could be said by negative implication to authorize concurrent judicial
and executive service. Article I, section 6 bars members of Congress
150
from simultaneously holding “any Office under the United States,”
a term that clearly encompasses judicial office. In thus barring a judge
or Justice from also serving in Congress, the Constitution tacitly
permits judges and Justices to hold positions in the executive branch.
Nonetheless, principles of separation of powers should be
understood to bar anyone from simultaneously holding office in the
executive and judicial branches. Finding such a principle in the tacit
postulates of the Constitution creates some textual embarrassment, to

146. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 402–03 (1989) (discussing cases
relating to the legality of judges’ extrajudicial services); see also supra text accompanying notes
135–143.
147. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
148. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (3d ed. 2009) (noting that
John Marshall served as both secretary of state and Chief Justice from January 1801 to the end
of John Adams’s presidency).
149. E.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN CONTEXT 96 (2008);
FALLON ET AL., supra note 107, at 68; KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 (16th ed. 2007).
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
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be sure; it renders the Incompatibility Clause of Article I
151
superfluous. But that is a relatively small price to pay to preserve a
core structural feature of the Constitution—even if it is one that was
violated by John Adams and the Federalist Congress that confirmed
Chief Justice Marshall.
Thus, we assume that there are constitutional limits on the ability
of active judges and Justices to play other roles in government, even
advisory ones. We do not find it necessary to say here where exactly
those limits are, although service on something like the Iraq Study
Group—given the assignment of the war powers to the political
branches—probably comes close to the line.
How do we reconcile that judgment with the judgment that
Justice O’Connor was permitted to serve on the Iraq Study Group?
Without attempting to define the boundaries precisely, we would say
that the limits on the performance of nonjudicial tasks by retired
Justices should be somewhat less strict than the limits for active
Justices, in part because of the accumulated experience and wisdom
reposed in the elite group of retired Justices and the service they
could continue to offer the United States. The rules and standards
governing permissible extrajudicial activities focus in substantial part
on appearances, after all, and a vigorous schedule of moonlighting
will typically appear worse when undertaken by an active judge or
Justice than when undertaken by a retired one.
To be sure, there are limits, even for retired Justices and senior
judges. For example, suppose then-Justice Hughes had retired rather
than resigned his seat as an Associate Justice before running for
president, won, and then attempted to adjudicate cases by designation
(assuming statutory authorization for doing so existed). Even if

151. Professor Seth Tillman argues that the Incompatibility Clause itself does not apply to
the president, only to officers serving under the president, but Professor Steven Calabresi
disagrees. Seth Barrett Tillman & Steven G. Calabresi, Debate, The Great Divorce: The Current
Understanding of Separation of Powers and the Original Meaning of the Incompatibility Clause,
157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 134, 134 (2008), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/
GreatDivorce.pdf. If one were to agree with Tillman that the president is permitted to serve in
Congress notwithstanding the Incompatibility Clause, then one would be very unlikely to find in
the general principle of separation of powers a prohibition on joint executive/judicial
officeholding. But we do not agree with Tillman, whose methodology neglects what Professor
Charles Black called “structural” inferences from the document and, for the reasons given by
Calabresi, appears to fail even on its own terms. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (1969) (expounding the structural method, in
which the relations among institutions created and recognized by the Constitution give rise to
principles of constitutional law).
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President/Justice Hughes only heard cases in which the United States
was not a party, we still think that this sort of arrangement would
have violated the separation of powers, and we expect that most
readers would share that view.
Where is the line between serving on the Iraq Study Group—
permissible for a retired Justice, in our view—and serving as secretary
of state or president—impermissible, in our view? The constitutional
text, history, and case law provide insufficient materials to answer this
question definitively. Our goal here is not to propound any particular
answer but instead simply to suggest that some kinds of moonlighting
that would be constitutionally impermissible if performed by active
judges and Justices may be permissible if performed by retired
152
Justices.
Why? Chiefly because a retired Justice, even if still part of the
judiciary in some sense, is, after all, retired. No longer a central part of
the business of the Court, retired Justices have a unique perspective,
that of both insiders and outsiders. Given the vagueness of the
separation-of-powers norm at issue, it would be a shame to deprive
the nation of that perspective or to make ineligibility to serve on the
Article III courts its price—if one thought that the Leahy proposal
were otherwise justified.
Of course, much of what retired Justices do when not hearing
cases on the lower courts, or—should something like the Leahy
proposal be adopted—on the Supreme Court, will be uncontroversial.
They can undertake judicial-administration projects, serve on blueribbon panels that address matters relating to the judiciary, and speak
and write on public affairs. Such activities are clearly compatible with
judicial office for active judges and Justices, thus leaving no doubt
that they are also permissible for retired Justices.
We do not suggest that there is some category of activities that
retired Justices and judges may undertake that is currently forbidden
to them. Our proposed modest relaxation of the restrictions on
retired Justices’ activities is one of degree rather than of kind. It can
perhaps be best illustrated by the example of the most prominent
federal court of appeals judge of the modern era, Richard Posner.

152. We refer in the text to retired Justices who wish to remain eligible to serve by
designation on the Supreme Court or on lower federal courts. Even the weak restrictions we
identify here would be inapplicable to retired Justices who chose not to be available for such
service, and, of course, nothing in this Article should be read to mean that we think retired
Justices should be required to continue to serve.
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Before ascending the bench, then-Professor Posner did not
153
hesitate to tackle controversial issues in his scholarship, nor has he
hesitated to do so since donning a judicial robe. While a judge on the
Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner has written a book about sex in which
he suggests that some unattractive women are lesbians because
154
appearance is less important to women than to men, has written a
155
critical evaluation of The 9/11 Commission Report that addressed
matters of national-security policy that would ordinarily be thought
156
far outside the ken of judicial competence, and has said that one of
the most reviled decisions in the history of the United States,
157
158
Korematsu v. United States, was “defensible.”
There is room for disagreement about the propriety of Judge
Posner’s extrajudicial activities, but there would likely be agreement
that he pushes the envelope for a sitting federal judge. That consensus
partly reflects the provocative nature of some of what Judge Posner
says, but it also partly reflects a judgment that a judge should not be a
public intellectual. According to this view, judges ought not opine
publicly at all about some topics, no matter how sensible or soberminded their substantive views on those topics.
By contrast, a retired and well-respected judge or Justice, as an
159
elder statesperson, is well situated to speak on judicial questions
and, more broadly, on issues of the day. Consider a 2010 essay that

153. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 342–46 (1978) (discussing the negative effects of the legal
prohibition on selling babies).
154. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 123 (1994) (“[H]omely women should
have relatively better lesbian than heterosexual opportunities because women tend to place less
value on good looks in a sexual partner than men do.”).
155. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT (2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf.
156. Richard A. Posner, The 9/11 Report: A Dissent, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, § 7 (Book
Review), at 1.
157. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
158. Pamela Karlan & Richard Posner, The Triumph of Expedience: How America Lost the
Election to the Courts, HARPER’S MAG., May 2001, at 31, 39. The statement was Posner’s alone.
Karlan, in dialogue with Posner, characterized the decision as “disastrous.” Id. at 37.
159. Recently, retired Justice Stevens made news by stating how he would have voted on
cases decided by his erstwhile colleagues. See Adam Liptak, Justice Stevens Is off the Bench but
Not Out of Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2011, at A14 (discussing a speech by Justice Stevens,
in which the retired Justice explained how he would have voted on several Supreme Court
decisions issued after his retirement). After Justice Powell retired, he announced that he had
changed his mind about the constitutionality of the death penalty. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR.,
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451–54 (1994).
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Justice O’Connor coauthored for the New York Times. In it, she
and her coauthors called on Congress to allocate $2 billion in funding
161
for research on Alzheimer’s disease. Principles of separation of
powers and judicial ethics could be invoked to call into question an
active judge or Justice’s attempting to influence the quintessentially
legislative power of the purse in this way—at least when the
allocations sought have nothing to do with the legal system. And
indeed, even though she was retired, Justice O’Connor was criticized
162
on just this ground. But notwithstanding the fact that at the time
she coauthored the essay Justice O’Connor was in some sense still “a
163
serving federal judge,” in another sense, she was not. Given her
extraordinarily high profile, her quite public struggle with her
husband’s
Alzheimer’s
affliction—which
occasioned
her
164
retirement —and the fact that she had retired from active service on
the Supreme Court, it oversimplifies matters to treat her as just
another judge. If a case involving Alzheimer’s funding were to come
before Justice O’Connor, whether sitting by designation on a lower
federal court or, if the Leahy bill were to pass, on the Supreme Court,
her past advocacy on the subject might require recusal, but the
advocacy, standing alone, strikes us as appropriate in light of her
status as a retired Justice.
CONCLUSION
The Leahy bill will not likely be enacted into law in the near
future, and mostly for good reason. As discussed in Part III, even
during a term in which Justice Kagan was recused in roughly onethird of the Court’s cases, there was no dire need for retired Justices
to serve as substitutes. Barring extraordinary circumstances, the
Court will soon return to its customarily small number of recusals,
rendering the bill even less necessary.

160. Sandra Day O’Connor, Stanley Prusiner & Ken Dychtwald, Op-Ed., The Age of
Alzheimer’s, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010, at A33.
161. Id.
162. See Ed Whelan, Justice O’Connor on Alzheimer’s Funding, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Oct.
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Moreover, even if a strong administrative case could be made for
the Leahy bill, politics would likely stymie it. All of the currently
retired Justices are, on average, more liberal than the Court’s current
median Justice, Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the majorityRepublican House of Representatives would be unlikely to support a
measure that would, in the short run and on average, move the Court
to the left in those cases in which it is salient. More broadly, in times
of divided government, one party or the other would have reasons to
oppose reactivating the retired Justices, on the ground that they
would either be too liberal or too conservative.
Nonetheless, the Leahy proposal warrants serious consideration
because it reveals a great deal about the Supreme Court as an
institution and about retired Justices. The evident constitutionality of
the Leahy proposal—and of the far more radical proposals that it
resembles in some important particulars—underscores just how
minimally the Constitution constrains Congress in its ability to shape
the federal courts.
As for retired Justices themselves, they already do not ride
quietly into the sunset, never to be heard from again. Retired Justices
in the modern era typically remain active in public life, speaking out
on important issues and calling upon the expertise that long judicial
service confers. Balancing the roles of elder statesperson and parttime judge or Justice can raise delicate questions of judicial ethics.
Nevertheless, the operative legal principles should be interpreted
broadly to permit retired Justices to serve in both capacities, lest the
public be deprived of their perspective on policy matters or the courts
be deprived of their contributions to the law.

